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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

KENNETH N. SILLI1H\N and
UTAH ALLOY ORES, INC.,
a Utah corporation,

)

)
)

)
)
)

Plaintiffs-Apellants,
vs.

Appeal No. 17054

)
)
)

REX T. POWELL, et al.,
Defendants-Respondents.

)
)

REPLY-BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This suit was commenced by appellants to quiet title to
their unpatented lode mining claims in the Yellow Cat mining
district of Grand County, Utah, after respondents attempted to
locate claims overlying those of appellants.

DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellants rely on their earlier statment as to the
disposition of the case in the lower court, including the
paragraph which the Powell respondents objected to at Page 2 of
their Brief.

The failure of the trial court to make any of the

findings necessitated by the doctrine of apportionment in the
-2-
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face of substantial undisputed evidence that assessment work had
been performed leads inexorably to the conclusion that, as
stated earlier, "the court in effect ruled that since it found
the work insufficient to satisfy

t~e

assessment requirement as

to all claims, the work was insufficient to meet the requirement
as to any claims."

Brief of Appellants at 3.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants request that this Court reverse and vacate the
judgment and findings of the Seventh Judicial District Court for
Grand County, and remand this case for a new trial on the issue
of the adequacy and sufficiency of the assessment work performed
by appellants on their claims during the period September 1,
1971, through September 1, 1978.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellants continue to rely on their Statement of Facts
contained in their earlier Brief to this court at pages 4-23
thereof.

Supplementing that statement, appellants controvert

the Statement of Material Facts of the Powell Respondents in the
following particulars.
Appellants take exception to the statement of the Powell
respondents at Page 3 of their Brief that seventy-six of
appellants eighty-four mining claims are not "contiguous" as
that term is normally used with reference to mining claims.
Each of the seventy-six mining claims in the main group of
-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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appellants either overlaps one or more other claims, adjoins one
or more claims along a substantial portion of a side or end
boundary, or has at least one point in common with another
claim.

At most eight of the seventy-six mining claims in the

main group could be said to be connected with the main group at
only a single point of reference (See Plaintiffs' Exhibit 11).
Moreover, the approximately three and one-half mile distance
over which this main group of claims extends cannot be
considered at all extraordinary considering the extensive reach
of the underlying uranium deposits that had been previously
located, and in many cases already partially mined, especially
when the later-located claims of the Powells covered the same or
greater surface area.

(See Exhibits 11 and 59.)

Furthermore, it is not true, as Powells assert at Page 4 of
their Brief, that when they located their claims they "found no
indication of prior claims," "found no location monuments • .
no corner monuments, and no evidence that recent assessment work
had been done in the area."

Powells did admit to seeing some

monuments and other workings that indicated the presence of
previous claims.

(Tr. at 565, and 632-38).

Additionally, the

check that Dan Powell made of the records at the Grand County
Recorder's Office, by his own testimony, only covered claims
whoses names and ownership had been identified in the field, and
thus no attempt was made to use a tract index to identify the
ownership of claims indicated by the presence of monuments and
markers which respondents did see in the field (Tr. at 566).
-4-
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The same applies to Teare respondents.

Despite the

assertions made in their Brief at Page 3, regarding the alleged
conscientiousness of the Teares to avoid locating claims in
conflict with pre-existing claims, _.the record is devoid of any
indication that Teares ever searched the tract index at the
County Recorder's Office to determine whether any mining claims
previously located conflicted with their own.

Teares also.

admitted to having seen some monuments and mine workings, the
status of which they claimed they could not identify and which
they conveniently assumed to have been abandonded

(~,

Tr. at

842, and 891).
Appellants further note that the statement at the top of
Page 8 of the Brief for the Powell respondents about previous
lawsuits is improper and should be stricken, for it involves a
part of the transcript of the Silliman deposition never read
into evidence at the trial.
Although it is true that the composite map known as Exhibit
11 showing all of appellants' mining claims does show minor (not
major) differences in the way no more than fifteen of plaintiffs
eighty-four claims were plotted by the different surveys, in
even the most extreme case the difference was no more than about
three hundred feet and the discrepancies were hardly such as to
create a "major obstacle" for determining the open ground that
remained available for location of new mining claims, as alleged
at Page 8 of the Powell Brief (Tr.

at 158-69}.
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Both groups of respondents in their Briefs challenge the
fifty-dollar per hour valuation figure used by appellant
Silliman in computing the value of his labor and improvements to
his claims.

However, contrary to the assertions of respondents,

this fifty-dollar figure is consistent with the testimony
introduced by witnesses for respondents.

The assessment work

whose value is in question covers the period from October 1972
through August 1977.

Brief of appellant at 13-17.

According to

the testimony of Mr. J. D. Wilson, the former owner of a dirt
contracting company who retired from the business in 1973, his
company charged sixteen dollars an hour for an operator at non
union wages and a D-6 Caterpillar in 1971 to do road work in the
Four Corners area.
such services.

He indicated that this was a going rate for

He further testified that prices had gone up

tremendously since he left the business and that 1971 was the
latest year for which he had records (Tr. at 645-48).

By late

1972, when appellant Silliman performed the first work relevant
to the present issues, he had over twenty-five years experience
as an operator of a caterpillar on mining claims.

Even without

considering Mr. Silliman's intimate knowledge of the claims in
the Yellow Cat area, his experience alone would have allowed him
to charge twenty-five dollars an hour in 1972 doing work on the
property of others.

When his intimate working knowledge of the

mining claims at issue acquired over a twenty-five year period
is considered, it is not at all unrealistic to state that the
value of work he performed on these claims would be doubled to
-6-
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the fifty dollar per hour figure used.

While it is true that

nominal rates continued to go up with inflation during the 1970s
dramatically, as Mr. Boulden testified, it seems apparent that
appellant Silliman was talking in ~eal, not nominal, terms for
the whole period involved and that is why the fifty-dollar
figure he used was not increased with the passage of time.
Appeallant Silliman's single valuation figure, reflecting real
purchasing power or labor vale in 1972, is the more appropriate
method of calculating the value of labor or improvements, as
those terms are used in 30

u.s.c.

§ 28, because it is the value

of labor performed on or benefiting the mining claim that
matters.
This testimony harmonizes with the approximate figure of
thirty dollars per hour quoted by appellant Silliman as the rate
charged for work he did on other property some year or two prior
to the time of trial7 this figure was not a 1979 figure as
Powell respondents assert in their Brief at pages 9 and 10 (Tr.
at 377, 406).

It should further be noted that the figures

quoted by Mr. Boulden at Page 11 of Powells' Brief are only
going rates for an outside operator, they are not rates that
reflect the experience of appellant Silliman and his knowledge
of the property in issue.
It should be noted that at page 13 of respondent Powell's
Brief there is an apparent typographical error.

On the sixth

and seventh lines from the bottom of the page, it states that of
212 total assessment work hours claimed for the year ending
-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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September 1, 1975, "197 11 hours were spent in road maintenance
and rehabilitation.

This should read "107 11 as on the fifth line

from the bottom of the page.
At Pages 13 through 17 of respondent Powell's Brief, much is
made of certain photos taken that were introduced at the trial
which were asserted to fairly represent some of the "principal"
roads in the disputed area.

While the photographs speak for

themselves, their relevance as to date and as to depiction of
areas where appellants performed assesment work has never been
established.

Appellants rely on their statements at Pages 19

and 20 of their earlier Brief.

A quick review of the pages of

the trial transcript cited there will immediately make it clear
that appellants first made their assertions about which roads
were maintained before the introduction of these photographs.
Appellants again object to the use at page 19 of the Powell
Brief of material from a deposition when that part of the
deposition was never read into evidence at the trial.

The

statement of the court at pages 412-13 of the trial transcript
that the depositions "are published and become a part of the
record" is not sufficient to allow the use on appeal of portions
of the depositions not actually read verbatim in court to
appeallant Silliman because to do so is to deny his rights to be
confronted with such material and to be given the opportunity to
explain any discrepancy that may exist.
Finally, it should be noted that the Powell respondents at
Page 26 of their Brief distort and misread what appellant said
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at Page 21 of their Brief relating to the lack of written
records kept by appellant to verify his account of assessment
performed.

Appellants reference to records later tendered

refers to their Motion for a New Trial with accompanying
affidavits of Kenneth and Blaine Silliman at pages 285-95 of the
Record, not the pages of the trial transcript which respondents
refer to.

ARGUMENT

I.

THE TRIAL COURT MISAPPLIED THE LAW APPLICABLE TO THE
PERFORMANCE OF ASSESSMENT WORK FOR
ASSOCIATED MINING CLAIMS
Responding to the first argument of appellants' Brief, the
Powell respondents, at page 34 of their Brief, conclude that the
trial court did not misapply the law to the facts of this case
but that it merely founds appellants; evidence as to what they
did without credibility.
scrutiny.

This conclusion does not withstand

The first paragraph of the court's Memorandum

Decision, the only document actually authored by the court,
stated that the court did not "reject as intentionally false any
of the testimony."

This statement plainly contradicts the

assertion of the Powell respondents that the Court found
appellants testimony "so incredulous that the Court was unable
to find any facts favorable to appellants."

Moreover, the
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alleged substantiation quoted above from Finding No. 18 is
merely a repetition of respondents' own prior conclusion,
inasmuch as this finding was drafted by respondents themselves.
Further examination of the

cou~t's

Memorandum Decision

supports the position of appellants that the court did not find
appellants' evidence with regard to the performance of
assessment work to be without substance, but that the court only
discounted the value of the work performed by appellants.
Beginning in the second paragraph, the Memorandum Decision
continues as follows:
The evidence of the Plaintiffs does not convince the
Court that sufficient or adequate assessment work
was done in order to hold the conflict areas
involved. The testimony of the other witnesses
define an ostensible lack of assessment work,
coupled with a general deterioration of or corner
and discovery monuments indicative of abandonment
brought on by the discontinuance of the productive
mining adventure that existed in years prior
thereto.
An additional element confronts the Court with
reference to the apparent lack of assessment work.
If claims are grouped so that assessment is
allocated to the entire group or groups, some
showing must be made that the entire group or groups
indeed derived some benefit.
In this case, where
the groupings are so diversified and spread, the
Court finds it difficult to find that road work,
claimed as assessment work, on roads that in no way
connect or service diversified groups of claims,
satisfies the requirements of the law, and
regulations mandating an intention to hold.

The inference is inescapable from this Memorandum Opinion
that the court accepted that at least most of the work alleged
to have been done by appellants was indeed performed.

What

-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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clearly concerned the court was the character of the work and
the benefit to the claims accruing therefrom, not the fact of
its performance.
With the realization that asse~sment work in some quantity
was performed by appellants upon or leading to their mining
claims, and that at least this much was accepted by the trial
court as having been proven, the next inquiry is whether the
work benefited the mining claims in question.
recently recognized in

As this Court

a case involving the Powell respondents

decided shortly after appellants' earlier Brief in this case was
filed, it is "universally recognized that [assessment] work need
not be performed on each individual claim, but may be made upon
an adjacent interrelated claim if it can be deemed to benefit
the claim."
1980).

Powell v. Atlas Corp., 615 P.2d 1225, 1228 (Utah

That holding of this Court reaffirmed as the law of this

state a position squarely opposed to that urged by Powells (the
same people who are among respondents in the present appeal) in
that case, namely that assessment work is not sufficient to
satisfy the requirements of 30

u.s.c.A

§ 28 when "not done on

certain of the claims themselves, but on other claims in the
area." Id., 615 P.2d at 1227.

It should be noted that the

similarities between Powell v. Atlas Corp. and the present case
are striking.

In both cases, Powells were junior locaters

asserting the invalidity of prior located claims on the basis
that proper assessment work had not been done.

The critical

assessment years were the same three as in the case at bar,
-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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namely those ending September 1, 1973, 1974, and 1975.

The only

difference is that in Powell v. Atlas Corp., the trial court did
not accept the position of the Powell's that work done outside
the boundaries of the claim may not be applied toward preserving
that claim from relocation while in the instant case, the trial
court, while voicing vague adherence to the theory that
assessment work performed for an entire group of claims is
sufficient to satisfy the federal statute where the claims are
benefitted by the work, misapplied this law to the facts by
demanding discharge of an almost impossible burden, namely that
drillsite preparation and road maintenance and rehabilitation to
provide access to claims for their future development over an
extensive deposit of uranium ore be allocated to artifically
small segments of a larger group in the face of uncontroverted
expert testimony that work tending to the development of any
part of this extensive ore body was work benefiting other parts
of the ore body as far as the claims extended and for up to a
distance of almost five miles.
Appellants' earlier Brief establishes sufficient
misunderstanding or misapplication of the relevant law to
require a retrial of the issue of the adequacy of the assessment
work performed by appellants in light of the clarification
provided by this Court of the law relating to assessment work
for groups of claims in Powell v. Atlas Corp.
This leads to a consideration of the value of the road work
performed by appellant Silliman which should be credited to his
-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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mining claims.

At page 39 of the Powell brief, it is asserted

that "'repetitive roadwork, especially road maintenance' does
not qualify as annual assessment work," on the authority of a
statement made in a seminar of Maroh 1, 1979, sponsored by the
Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation.

It should be noted that

this seminar was one prepared for and delivered to landmen and
paralegals.

Such a restrictive view of what work will qualify

as assessment work does not conform with what the law is.
Furthermore, this statement is not the view of the Rocky
Mountain Mineral Law Foundation as an institution, but merely
that of the author of the quoted paper, and by no stretch of the
imagination is it a "consensus of hundreds of lawyers and
scholars who devote a great percentage of their time to mining
law and who are recognized on a national level as experts in
their field," as respondents assert.

Indeed, in another

publication of the same Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation
entitled "Annual Assessment Work" and subtitled "A definitive
Legal Research Manual," it is stated at pages 2-35 and 2-36
that:
The construction and maintenance of roads for
access to and from claims has always been considered
to be labor or improvement for annual assessment
work, provided it is directly related to the
development of the claims or facilitation of
extraction of minerals from them.
For further support of the proposition that road work, including
road maintenance, is clearly labor satisfing the requirements of
30 U.S.C.A. § 28, see the cases and other materials cited at
pages 32-35 of appellants earlier Brief.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
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It should also be noted that contrary to the assertions at
page 41 of the Powell brief, mere proximity of a claim to a
county road does not render work on private roads connecting the
claim or associated drillsites to the county road valueless.
Unless there are roads to transport machinery to the claim and
ores from the claim, mere proximity of another road is of no
help.
Nor is it accurate to characterize appellants' assessment
work as mere token compliance with the requirements of the
federal statute to discredit the good faith with which the work
was performed.

This road work clearly had no purpose other than

the development of the ore body present.

No other purpose for

building roads in the Yellow Cat vicinity existed.

While it may

be admitted that a primary motivation for performing this work
during the years in issue was to satisfy the requirements of the
law, that is because it was economically imprudent, not only for
appellants, but for anyone else, to do more than this minimal
development work in light of existing market conditions.

Yet

this does not discredit the good faith of appellants because
they had already spent more than 25 years actively mining the
area in question prior to the temporary cessation of such
activities in 1972.

Support for this position is provided in a

consideration of the justification for the assessment work
requirement set out at Section 7.2 of Volume 2 of the respected
treatise entitled The American Law of Mining edited by the Rocky
Mountain Mineral Law Foundation, which reads:
-14-
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The purpose of the assessment work requirement
is to assure good faith and diligence and to prevent
a claimant from locating numerous mining claims and
holding the claims without working them, thus
preventing others from occupying and developing the
property.
The cheif objection to the assessment work
requirement is that the mining industry is
particularly susceptible to fluctuating prices.
When the price of the product from a particular mine
justifies operations, the mine will be developed or
worked regardless of the assessment work
requirement. On the other hand, during periods of
deflated prices, the assessment work requirement
merely adds to the economic woes of the already
troubled mine owner. This objection is appropriate
when applied to claim owners who actually mine their
claims when economic conditions permit. However,
the objection is not applicable to those persons who
acquire mining property for purposes of speculation;
if there were no assessment work requirement, or
some adequate substitute, all potentially valuable
mineral land would soon be located as mining claims
and would never again be available for bona fide
location.
To this it may be added that mining claim owners, like all
other business men, seek to maximize their profits by minimizing
expenses through prudent exploration and development.

The

government, while justly requiring the expenditure of time and
effort to improve the claims as evidence of the locator's good
faith, must protect the locator's investment in these
improvements as long as the locator is substantially complying
with the annual assessment work requirements and allow the
locator sufficient time to prudently develop the claim and
extract the ore therefrom or the locator, without such assurance
of future protection, will be loath to expend any substantial
amount of time and effort making the investments in ore
extraction and claim development desired by society.

If the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain
errors.
-15_

courts are too quick in declaring forfeitures,

few individuals

will be willing to take the risk of inadvertantly losing
significant investments of time and money, leaving a greatly
restricted pool of very risk
mineral extraction industry.

prefe~ring

parties to engage in the

This course would lead to a

concomitant increase in purely speculative holdings and society
at large would be the loser with less minerals being marketed at
correspondingly higher prices for an unchanged or increasing
demand level.

II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOCATING
THE BURDEN OF ASSESSMENT WORK
"[T]he burden of proving a forfeiture is always upon the
party relying upon the same .

.

"

Hall v. Kearney, 18 Colo.

505, 33 P. 373 (1893), cited by Powells at page 31 of their
brief.

This risk of non-persuasion is borne by the party urging

a forfeiture throughout the duration of a trial and can only be
discharged by clear and convincing proof.

New Mercur Mining Co.

v. South Mercur Mining Co., 102 Utah 131, 128 P. 2d 269, 272
{1942) cert. den. 319 U.S. 753 {1943).

It is only the "burden"

of going forward or the duty to produce evidence substantial
enough to get past a motion for summary judgment that shifts
from a junior locator to a senior locator when it is shown that
the assessment work performed by the senior locator included
work performed outside the boundary of the claims which the work
-16Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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is asserted to have benefitted.

Once the senior locator

presents such ·evidence, the risk of non-persuasion always borne
by the junior locator compels him to rebut the evidence that the
assessment work had been performed_by the senior locator as
alleged or to show that this work did not benefit the mining
claims for whose behalf it is asserted.
In the present case, it is clear the court did not reject in
toto the fact of the performance of the assessment work
described by appellants and offered in evidence.

It is likewise

clear that respondents did not introduce any substantial
evidence to rebut the evidence presented by appellant Silliman
and his expert witness that the work of appellants would benefit
the entire body of appellants' claims.

The alleged inability of

the trial court to make a finding as to the value of the
assessment work performed by appellants is not, as respondents
asserted, due to the failure of appellants to produce credible
evidence of the value of their work.

This so-called finding of

fact drafted· by respondents and quoted at paqe 44 of the Powell
Brief was the result of an improper allocation of the burden of
proof inasmuch as the evidence offered by respondents fell
substantially short of the quantity required to rebut the
evidence offered by appellants.
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III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT APPLYING THE
DOCTRINE OF APPORTIONMENT.
Even if the trial court did not accept in toto the evidence
offered by appellants as to the quantity and value of the
assessment work they performed, it is clear that the court did
not reject all of this evidence either.

Given the undisputed

fact that some assessment work was performed by appellants for
the benefit of their claims and the fact that the character of
this work was never shown not to confer the benefits claimed for
it, the trial court defaulted in its duty by not finding the
value so conferred on appellants' mining claims.

Such a failure

to make required findings of fact is reversible error.

Romrell

v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 611 P. 2d 392 (Utah 1980.).

Once the

value of the work is established pursuant to the apportionment
doctrine of Utah Standard Mining Co. v. Tintic Indian Chief
Mining & Milling Co., 73 Utah 456, 274 P. 950 (1929), it must be
determined how that value is to be allocated among the several
claims benefited by the work where that value is short of the
statutory minimum for preserving all the mining claims.

In the

instant case, it cannot be determined at this point whether this
is the case because the trial court refused to make a finding as
to the value of the work performed by appellants.

However, even

assuming the trial court might have found that the total value
of appellants' assessment work was less than that necessary to
preserve all their claims, the decision must be faced as to how
-18-
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that value is to be allocated.

The law of this state as

established in Utah Standard is that the greatest number of
claims possible should be preserved by allocating the total
value of the labor performed or improvements made to as many of
the claims actually benefited by the work as possible.

This

rule is not unduly generous for it merely secures for the owner
of a senior location who has acted in good faith the exclusive
riqht to continue developing that amount of mineral land for
which he has paid the full investment price required by law and
for which he continues to bear all the risk that the venture
will not prove profitable.

CONCLUSION
For the trial court's failure to properly apply the
standards of law relating to the group development of claims
held in common,
of proof,

for its failure to properly allocate the burden

for its failure to make findings necessitated by the

doctrine of apportionment, and for manifest confusion on what
the facts were and on which facts were relevant to a
determination of the issues in this case, or for any one of
those errors, the trial court's decision should be reversed, all
findings vacated, and this matter remanded for a new trial on
the limited issue of complience with the requirements of 30

u.s.c.

Section 28.
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day of February, 1981.

Respectfully submitted this if,-
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